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Did you hear about the politician who promised 
that, if he was elected, he’d make certain that 
everybody would get an above average income? 
And nobody laughed... 
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Illusory control is an expectancy of a personal 
success probability inappropriately higher than 








Using data from the Business Surveys Unit of the European Commission, this paper 
examines how, and how accurately, people assess economic systems. As expected, 
respondents demonstrate to know their own situation better than the system wide one, 
and the past better than the future. Also, correctly, perceptions accumulate towards 
the long run “stationarity” of the economic stance. In contrast, the presence of a long-
run bias in the “forecast” error is detected. Evidence shows that it is due to people’s 
tendency to judge over-pessimistically and/or to forecast over-optimistically. Finally, 
individuals seem to believe that their own situation may consistently drift apart from 
the general one. I interpret commonsense behaviors as supporting the reliability of 
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In many countries consumer sentiment indexes (CSI) play a relevant role in public 
discussions of the economy. CSI are so commonly diffused and commented at their 
“face value”, that it seems that what is behind them be considered as known as not to 
require explanation. As refer to economic literature, by and large, three main strands 
of research have been addressing CSI. The first clusters around the evaluation of its 
predictive power in forecasting aggregate consumption and/or other macroeconomic 
variables (see Ludvigson, 2004 for a review). This is not surprisingly since consumer 
surveys are intended for short-term economic analysis (European Commission, 2004), 
as  mirrored  in  their  high  (usually  monthly)  frequency.  The  second  makes  use  of 
survey data to appraise the rationality of consumers' expectations (Souleles, 2004; 
Forsells and Kenny, 2004; Carrol, 2001, 2003; Stephens, 2003). Apart from inflation, 
the  research  on  consumer  expectations  about  the  economy  is  quite  limited  and 
attempts  to  explain  puzzling  results  are  even  rarer.  This  literature  is  often  based 
directly  on  CSI,  which  are  indexes  stemming  from  the  aggregation  of  survey 
responses  to  a  set  of  questions  about  current  and  expected  economic  conditions 
(exemptions  are  Souleles,  2004;  Dominitz  and  Manski,  2004).  The  third  strand 
focuses on converting qualitative data obtained in surveys into quantitative indexes 
for a number of economic variables. Needless to say, the quantification of categorical 
survey responses is to some extent intrinsically arbitrary, since survey responses are a 
subjective assessment of the expected or actual behavior of a variable
1. Converting 
qualitative  messages  into  quantitative  statistics  is  an  intensive  area  of  research 
(Mitchell and Weale, 2005; Mitchell, Smith and Weale, 2005; European Commission, 
2004). Driver and Urga (2004) survey several statistical ways of inferring quantitative 
signals from qualitative data, concluding that no method has imposed itself as being 
clearly superior to the others. Dominitz and Manski (2004) conclude that indexes 
based on disparate and non-commensurate elements are not the best way to decipher 
information on consumer beliefs. An indirect confirmation of the issues surrounding 
this topic comes from everyday practice, where virtually identically targeted CSI are 
                                                 
1  A  recent  and  promising  practice  elicits  from  survey  respondents  probabilistic  expectations  of 
significant personal events (Manski, 2004). This paper deals with long-running traditional qualitative 
surveys only.    3 
based on different approaches. In the US, each of the single questions pertaining to 
the (University of Michigan) overall CSI has three possible answers which are "good 
times", "no change" and "bad times". The weights of the answers are respectively 1,0 
and  -1.  In  Japan,  there  are  five  possible  responses  to  questions:  "improve", 
"somewhat  improve",  "no  change",  "somewhat  deteriorate"  and  "deteriorate".  For 
each question, the answers are respectively assigned the following weights: 1, 3/4, 
2/4, 1/4 and 0. In Europe, five similar response options (see below) are weighted, 
respectively, 1, 1/2, 0, -1/2, -1. In all cases, the overall index is calculated as a simple 
average of individual indicators. Thus, somewhat curiously, while in Japan pessimists 
are left out by CSI, elsewhere the zero weight is assigned to “no change” persons. In 
the US, on the other hand, extreme positions are not allowed. To further confuse the 
matter,  Canada  follows  another  approach.  While  its  weights  are  centered  as  in 
Europe/US, the questions relate to consumer's financial situation over the past/next 
six months. Elsewhere, the time window is one year. 
Due to their importance in political and economic circles, the relevance of getting a 
better  understanding of survey  response behavior seems obvious.  Even if modern 
research have been following other directions, as  far back as fifty  years ago, the 
Federal Reserve Consultant Committee on Consumer Survey Statistics (the so called 
Smithies Committee, 1955), as well as Tobin (1959) and Juster (1964), recommended 
that predictive power be evaluated by the ability of individual survey responses to 
predict  subsequent  individual  outcomes  reported  later  in  re-interviews
2.  Then,  the 
attitudinal  research  (Dominitz  and  Manski,  2003,  1999;  Das,  Dominitz,  and  van 
Soest; 1999; Manski, 2004) has made clear why the analysis of the micro foundations 
of consumer confidence indexes may be important. One obvious problem is that some 
of  the  events  about  which  respondents  are  queried  are  remarkably  vague,  e.g. 
“general  economic  conditions”,  and  it  may  be  that  different  respondents  do  not 
interpret  the  same  question  in  the  same  way.  Thus,  responses  could  be  not 
comparable across individuals. Other, actually sparse, works (Oppenlander and Poser, 
                                                 
2  As  mentioned  in  the  main  text,  this  turned  out  to  be  the  minority  view.  Mainstream  literature 
proceeded according to Katona (1957) and Mueller (1957), which suggested that aggregate predictive 
tests may also be useful.    4 
1986;  European  Commission  1997;  Dominitz,  1998)  have  addressed  the  potential 
criticism that there may be little incentive for respondents to reply truthfully
3.  
Against  this  framework,  I  address  household  surveys  to  extract  usually  neglected 
facts via an unusual analysis solely based on individual data. While Dominitz and 
Manski (2004)  address the following issue -  “How  should we measure consumer 
confidence?” – I try to shed some light on “what do consumer surveys measure?”. 
Indeed, my goal, and novelty, is threefold. First, making use of standard consumer 
surveys as a long-running-large-scale experiment, I examine whether there emerge 
any robust stylized facts on agents’ cognitive macroeconometrics. Otherwise stated, I 
canvass opinion on economy as a whole and on how people think the system-wide 
economic  situation  interacts  with  their  own  economic  sphere.  Second,  I  verify  if 
survey responses faithfully express people’s point of view and if they are internally 
consistent. For instance, I check if agents know their own situation better than the 
system wide one, or the past better than the future. I interpret commonsense results as 
supporting the  reliability  of survey data. Third,  seeking  explanations for puzzling 
outcomes,  I  resort  to  cognitive  economics  (Tversky  and  Kahneman,  1986,  1982, 
1974,  1973).  This  latter  emerged  in  the  last  decades
4  as  the  study  of  economic 
systems based on the cognitive capacities and processes of the participating social 
agents, their knowledge, beliefs, desires and intentions. Thus, examining pervasive 
surveys of people in households in the light of cognitive economics appears only 
natural.  However,  I  am  aware  of  no  work  with  this  scope.  Illusion  of  control, 
depressive realism, and the law of small numbers are among well known cognitive 
phenomena, pointed out by psycho-economists in laboratory/field tests, which can be 
usefully applied even in the present long-run macro context.  
Somewhat  confirming  previous  findings  on  consumers  inflation  expectations 
(Souleles 2004; Forsells and Kenny, 2004; Carrol, 2001, 2003), the empirical analysis 
leads to conclude that people sometimes behave according to Homo Oeconomicus, 
sometimes not. Predictable results show that agents know i) their own situation better 
than  the  system  wide  one,  and  ii)  the  past  better  than  the  future.  Also,  iii)  the 
sentiment accumulates towards the “long-term stationarity” of the economic stance. 
                                                 
3 In behavioral economics there usually are monetary incentives for respondents (Smith, 1976). 
4 Psychology professor D. Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Prize in economic sciences.   5 
These commonsense behaviors support previous results on the inner coherence and 
reliability  of  survey  data  (Oppenlander  and  Poser,  1986;  European  Commission, 
1997;  Dominitz,  1998;  Manski,  2004).  The  paradoxical  outcomes  refer  to  i)  the 
presence  of  a  long  run  bias  in  the  “forecast”  error,  which  is  due  to  ii)  people’s 
tendency  to  judge  over-pessimistically  and/or  to  iii)  forecast  over-optimistically. 
Lastly, closely mimicking the situation described by the aforequoted joke, iv) agents 
seem  to  believe  that  their  own  situation  may  systematically  drift  apart  from  the 
general one. Anticipating one of the proposed interpretations, illusion of control may 
help to explain why individuals show systematically dissociate expectations when 
referring  to  personal  vs  general  economic  conditions.  Indeed,  according  to 
psychologists, illusory control is “an expectancy of a personal success probability 
inappropriately higher than the objective probability would warrant” (Langer 1975, p. 
313). Thus, referring to the quotations at the beginning of the text, the same situation 
may be seen both as a statistical joke and as a serious psychological result. Who is 
right? Since human being is multifaceted, my feeling is that we need every point of 
view. Occasionally, I will match statistics and psychology throughout this work.       
The paper is organized as follow. The next section deals with the data, section 3 
focuses on  the  statistical analysis and the results. Section  4 offers some  tentative 
interpretations of the most puzzling findings. Concluding remarks close the paper. 
 
 '$7$
The data are drawn from the Business Surveys Unit of the European Commission
5. 
They are based on monthly surveys carried out at a national level by  public and 
private institutes in the framework of the Joint Harmonised European Union (EU) 
Programme  of  Business  and  Consumer  Surveys
6  (European  Commission,  1997). 
Logically, in order to achieve representativeness, the bigger member countries use a 
larger sample. The starting date is January 1985 for nine out of fifteen EU countries. 
Exemptions  are  Austria  (starting  date  1995:10),  Finland  (1987:11),  Luxembourg 
(2002:01), Portugal (1986:06), Spain (1986:06), and Sweden (1995:10). The sample 
                                                 
5 Available on demand at http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/index_en.htm 
6 Detailed information on the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys 
can be found in European Commission (1997, 2004).   6 
stops in July 2005 for all countries. Currently, almost 33,000 consumers are surveyed 
every  month  across  the  EU.  Persons  are  usually  selected  by  a  random  stratified 
sampling  procedure  or  by  simple  random  sampling.  At  the  moment,  the  most 
widespread method is the telephone interview. Participants in the survey are asked the 
following  questions,  which  are  harmonized  in  all  countries  according  to  the  EU 
guidelines: 
Ex post questions:  
 
Q1 How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? It has ...  
Q3 How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 
months? It has ...  
 
PP)   got a lot better  
P)     got a little better  
E)     stayed the same  
M)    got a little worse  
MM) got a lot worse  
N)     don’t know.  
 
Ex ante questions:  
 
Q2 How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months? It 
will ... 
Q4 How do you expect the general economic situation in the country to develop over the next 12 
months? It will ...  
 
PP)   get a lot better  
P)     get a little better  
E)     stay the same  
M)    get a little worse  
MM) get a lot worse  
N)     don’t know.  
 
In fact, national surveys contain other ex ante and ex post questions about the labor 
market,  spending  intentions  on  major  purchases  (furniture,  electrical/electronic 
devices, etc.), savings, etc. While each question has a potential information content, I 
focus  only  on  the  mentioned  four  queries.  Hopefully,  they  should  constitute  a 
sufficient information set in the present context. The most common way of presenting 
consumers survey data is the balance, that is the difference between positive and 
negative percentages. Let PP, P, E, etc. denote the percentages respondents having 
chosen  the  corresponding  option,  so  that  PP+P+E+M+MM+N=100.  Balances  are 
calculated as  
B = (PP + ½P) í½M + MM).   7 
The  index  is  then  calculated  as  a  simple  average  of  individual  indicators.  As 
mentioned, other countries follow other rules. In Japan, the aggregate index does not 
take into account pessimists (in that they have a zero weight); in the US, citizens can 
not take extreme positions (their response options are good, same, bad); in Canada, 
people  are  thought  to  be  short-sighted  (they  are  allowed to judge/forecast  over  a 
semester only). While this calls for more research efforts and attention in comparing 
CSI across countries, I do not address aggregation/quantification issues, analyzing the 
single response options without further manipulations
7. The data set suffer from some 
modifications throughout the sample. Since 1995, for instance, Italy substituted on-
the-spot interviews with the telephone method. In Germany, apart from the issues 
stemming from the re-unification of 1991, there have been some modifications in the 
order as well as in the wording of some questions. I was not been able to find data 
issues for other countries, but a first impression of them can be drawn by the graphs 
reported in Appendix 2 (e.g., data for Portugal are not available from February 1997 
to August 1997). Altogether it means that there are difficulties in the comparability of 
the data. Then, it is easily understood that the queries are remarkably vague
8 and, 
unlike usual behavioral experiments (because, obviously, the target is different), there 
are not incentives/disincentives related to a particular answer. Finally, persons are 
usually  selected  randomly,  in  that  somewhat  preventing  the  Smithies 
recommendation  to  perform  analyses  via  re-interviews.  On  the  positive  side,  the 
dataset constitutes a unique continuous long-running continental-scale harmonized 
“experiment”. Also, I analyze full-sample descriptive statistics with no attempt to 
aggregate/quantify survey data. All in all it should allow establishing the basic facts I 
am looking for in a very robust way.  

 67$7,67,&$/$1$/<6,6$1'5(68/76
The data described in the previous section can be examined and assessed along a 
number of dimensions. In the present setting, some quick and simple experiments 
                                                 
7 Usually CSI are subject to seasonal adjustments, as well. Needless to say, this increases the number 
of assumptions on which the overall index is based. The proposed framework allows sidestepping even 
this potential problem.   
8 An anecdote may help to clarify this issue. In answering to journalists’ questions on Italian economic 
slowdown, Mr. Berlusconi (Italian Prime Minister) stated the following: “I have never met the GDP”.   8 
based on reply options allow verifying some commonsense-predictable scores. For 
instance, do consumers know their own situation better than the system wide one? If 
this is the case, the average share of individuals answering “don’t know” to questions 
about the general environment should be greater than the average share of individuals 
which  do  not  know  how  their  own  situation  is  going  on.  A  similar  trial  can  be 
performed by comparing corresponding ex ante vs ex post replies in order to see 
whether  consumers  feel,  as  expected,  more  uncertain  about  the  future.  Thus,  the 
simple  comparison  between  usually  neglected  information  can  confirm/negate 
interesting behavioral conjectures. 
 
7DE Consumers’ uncertainty on Personal vs General and Past vs Future economic conditions 
   3HUVRQDO *HQHUDO
  43DVW 4)XWXUH 43DVW 4)XWXUH
AUSTRIA  0.98  2.97  2.43  4.04 
BELGIUM  2.96  6.69  6.05  10.8 
GERMANY  1.36  4.73  2.32  5.58 
DENMARK  0.66  3.70  7.11  8.85 
GREECE  0.16  4.46  1.95  7.68 
SPAIN  1.09  9.68  5.37  14.8 
FINLAND  0.60  3.59  3.34  4.89 
FRANCE  0.48  4.23  1.66  8.76 
IRELAND  0.94  4.88  1.97  6.97 
ITALY  0.50  4.68  1.95  6.32 
LUXEMBOURG  1.16  3.46  4.67  5.59 
NETHERLANDS  1.08  4.50  7.00  11.0 
SWEDEN  0.77  2.21  5.49  4.77 
PORTUGAL  1.33  11.2  5.47  15.7 
UK  1.57  5.93  4.62  9.84 
EU11  1.02  5.08  3.93  8.58 
EU11=Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, UK (sample 87:11-05:07) 
Full sample average of responses “don’t’ know” (in % of total) to the questions: 
Q1=How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? 
Q2=How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months? 
Q3=How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 months? 
Q4=How do you expect the general economic situation in the country to develop over the next 12 months? 
 
 
The picture emerging from table 1 is plain. Europeans do report a greater uncertainty 
in addressing both system wide conditions, as opposed to familiar ones, and future 
developments as opposed to past situations. Another intriguing experiment deals with 
the  “E”  answer.  Since  the  queries  are  about  “developments/changes”,  individuals 
should respond, on average, “the same” the most part of times (Theil, 1961), because 
it is hard to think  to ever improving/worsening economic conditions (whatever  it   9 
means for common people
9) over many years.In addition, the preference of being “E” 
may be partly due to the fact that this “neutral” option may be chosen by uninformed 
and/or uninterested respondents. In appendix 1, I report the empirical distributions of 
the  full  sample  means  of  the  six  response  options.  The  visual  impact  of  the 
histograms is self-evident - individuals reply, on average, “the same” the most part of 
times. It is worth recalling that in the European weighting scheme, both “N” and “E” 
respondents do not affect the overall CSI.  
All the tests performed so far may be thought of as supporting the reliability of the 
survey “overall experiment”. Indeed, the proposed distributions shed some lights on 
other interesting features of consumers’ replies. The number of agents responding 
“the  same”  when  elicited  about  personal  as  opposed  to  general  economic 
developments  is  much  higher.  Perceptions  about  the  personal  context  show  a 
unimodal distribution in E, with a very high percentage of E. On the contrary, beliefs 
on the general environment display ten (out of thirty) M-peaks with an almost halved 
E. This calls for ad hoc experiments to contrast general vs personal and ex-ante vs ex-
post response options. One simple way to address the former issue is computing mean 
values of (Q1+Q2)-(Q3+Q4) for each single item (leaving aside the already studied E 
and N). The term (Q1+Q2) refers to the two personal queries, the second to the pair 
of  general  questions  (see  section  2).  Thus,  negative  (positive)  values  in  columns 
“MM”  and  “M”  (“PP”  and  “P”)  of  table  2  imply  that  the  personal  condition  is 
perceived to be systematically better than the general one. Table 2 collects the results, 
where  bold  values  highlight  a  personal  condition  perceived  to  be  worse  than  the 
general one. Such values amount to a low 28% (seventeen out of sixty experiments), 
therefore  there  is  a  strong  clue  that  agents’  sentiment  about  their  own  economic 
condition is consistently better than the general one. Moreover, as already noticed, the 
response option “the same” shows a much lower share in queries eliciting general 
economic conditions. As a consequence, in passing from Q1,Q2 to Q3,Q4 questions, 
some “E” individual responds differently. Table 2 leads to conclude that most part of 
                                                 
9 To the extent i) GDP growth coincides with people’s view of “development in economic condition”, 
and ii) GDP growth follows a stationary process agents should, on average, accumulate towards the 
“stationary” item of the questionnaire. It is worth noticing that the average GDP (and Consumption) 
growth has been positive for each and every country during the years under scrutiny (the same holds in 
per capita terms), whereas Europeans seem to be more pessimists than optimists (see also footnote 7).   10 
them becomes pessimist. By the comparison between the figures in column M and in 
column P it results that pessimists are more numerous than optimists in twelve out of 
fifteen experiments. All in all, bold values are a small minority and have smaller 
values than the others. It turns out that the personal condition is considered to be 
systematically better than the general one.        
   11 
7DE Comparing Personal vs General Sentiment in fifteen European Countries 
  33 3 0 00
AUSTRIA  1.0   -25.0  -8.1 
BELGIUM  1.0   -26.0  -19.0 
GERMANY  0.6   -23.0  -12.0 
DENMARK  10.0   -17.0  -3.4 
GREECE    -5.3  -5.5 
SPAIN    -16.0  -9.3 
FINLAND  3.8   -14.0  -3.9 
FRANCE  2.2  1.5  -31.0  -23.0 
IRELAND    -10.0  -13.0 
ITALY    -22.0  -26.0 
LUXEMBOURG  2.8  1.7  -50.0  -8.0 
NETHERLANDS  5.1   -15.0  -9.9 
SWEDEN  -0.4   -22.0  -8.0 
PORTUGAL  6.6   -21.0  -2.9 
UK  5.3   -14.0  -14.0 
EU11  2.1   -18.6  -12.7 
EU11=Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, UK (sample 87:11-05:07). 
Country-rows report mean values of (iQ1+iQ2)-(iQ3+iQ4) where i=PP,P,M,MM. PP=a lot better; P=a little better; 







, when i=MM, iQ1= % of agents responding “my financial 
situation changed a lot worse over the last 12 months”.  Clearly, negative (positive) values in columns “MM” and “M” (“PP” and 
“P”) mean that the personal condition (Q1,Q2) is perceived to be systematically better than the general one (Q3,Q4). Bold values 
show the opposite. 
 
Alike, table 3 gathers mean values of (Q1+Q3)-(Q2+Q4) for each single response 
option (again excluding E and N). The first term, (Q1+Q3), refers to the ex-post 
queries, the second to the ex-ante questions. In this case, positive (negative) values in 
columns  “MM”  and  “M”  (“PP”  and  “P”)  imply  that  judgments  (Q1,Q3)  are 
systematically worse than forecasts (Q2,Q4).  
 
7DE  Comparing Judgments vs Forecasts in fifteen European Countries 
  33 3 0 00
AUSTRIA  -0.8  -13.0  14.0  12.0 
BELGIUM   -7.4  14.0  11.0 
GERMANY    12.0  9.4 
DENMARK   -3.0  3.8  3.6 
GREECE  -0.9  -12.0  27.0  5.8 
SPAIN   -7.9  16.0  8.6 
FINLAND   -8.1  6.1  7.3 
FRANCE  -0.8  -11.0  12.0  15.0 
IRELAND   -2.3  13.0  14.0 
ITALY  -0.9  -15.0  23.0  17.0 
LUXEMBOURG  -0.3  -15.0  18.0  4.2 
NETHERLANDS   -1.5   10.0 
SWEDEN   -5.0  12.0  4.9 
PORTUGAL   -9.0  5.9  5.2 
UK   -9.9  12.0  15.0 
EU11   -7.2  12.7  10.2 
EU11=Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, UK (sample 87:11-05:07). 
Country-rows report mean values of (iQ1+iQ3)-(iQ2+iQ4). PP, P, M, MM and Q1-Q4 see under table 1. When 
i=MM, iQ1= % of agents responding “my financial situation changed a lot worse over the last 12 months”. Clearly, positive 
(negative) values in the columns “MM” and “M” (“PP” and “P”) mean that judgments (Q1,Q3) are systematically worse than 
forecasts (Q2,Q4). Bold values show the opposite. 
   12 
The picture arising from table 3 suggests that, when consulted about the economy, 
people’s  judgments  are  worse  than  forecasts  even  considering  hundreds  of  tests 
performed across several countries. The detected difference between ex ante and ex 
post perceptions recommends refining the experiment. As a matter of fact, according 
to one of the basic assumption of the standard neoclassical models, agents should not 
consistently repeat the same mistakes. In the present framework, it may be addressed 
by looking at the gap between “contemporaneous” ex ante and ex post responses, to 
which I refer as the “forecast error”. An example may help to clear the matter. Let the 
share of individuals forecasting that the system wide economic situation will be “a 
little worse” in the next year be, according to the survey performed in January 2000, 
35%. After a year, interviewed are asked to say how the general economic situation in 
the country has changed over the past 12 months. If people’s forecasts in January 
2000 were corrected, then the share of individuals judging that the economic situation 
has got “a little worse” should be 35%. It is noteworthy that, in this setting, there is 
no need for agents to correctly address what a “general economic situation” really is. 
In  fact,  I  just  compare  answers  given  to  the  same  question.  With  the  potential 
exemption of “don’t know”, which is a “non” response
10 (i.e. it is not the outcome of 
an explicit elaboration but, rather, a declaration of no information), the equivalence 
should hold for each and every possible ex ante vs ex post same-period-referring 
pairs. Needless to say the bias should be zero only on average, allowing for short-
living forecast errors (this is why it is usually called the “long-run bias”), perhaps 
partly  due  to  the  different  individuals  interviewed, too.  In  appendix  2,  I  plot  the 
forecast errors  and I  report  some descriptive statistics.  Forecast errors sustain the 
previous conclusion. People show an evident asymmetry towards the future, keeping 
on thinking that things, as compared to what they themselves think it is happened, 
will  improve.  E-agents  turn  out  to  be  the  most  “rational”  (or,  better,  the  less 
emotional) – the values of their forecast errors are the lowest. Anyway, as mentioned, 
this  ex-ante-ex-post  coherence  could  be  partly  due  to  the  appealing  of  keeping 
neutral. Clearly, psychological neutrality is different from analytical rationality. Then, 
reflecting  agents’  difficulties  in  addressing  more  complex  tasks  (Thaler,  1999), 
                                                 
10 On that, European Commission Users’ Manual (1997, p. 18) claims that: “(…) there are six reply 
options: five “real” ones and a “do not know” option.”.   13 
opinions about the system wide situation should show a greater volatility. In order to 
save space I do not report single item standard errors
11, although an indirect clue may 
be found by looking at the standard errors of personal vs general forecasts errors 
(Appendix 2). 
Somewhat confirming earlier findings on consumers inflation expectations (Souleles 
2004; Forsells and Kenny, 2004; Carrol, 2001, 2003), the picture emerging from the 
proposed  empirical  analysis  leads  to  conclude  that  people  behave  sometimes  as 
expected,  sometimes  not.  Among  predictable  behaviors  it  results  that,  over  time, 
across countries, and for the most part of the response options:  
 
1.  agents think to know their own situation better than the system wide one, and 
the past better than the future; 
2.  opinions  about  the  system  wide  situation  show  a  greater  volatility  as 
compared to personal situation replies; 
3.  responses  accumulate  towards  a  “long-run  stationarity”  of  the  economic 
stance. 
Side by side with these conventional scores, somewhat supporting the reliability of 
survey experiments, some paradoxical outcomes emerge as well. They refer to: 
1.  people’s  tendency  to  judge  over-pessimistically  and/or  to  forecast  over-
optimistically. Hence, 
2.  people’s forecasts show a long run bias. 
3.  People’s belief that their own situation can be systematically different from 
the general one.  
To  sum  up  the  puzzling  results,  it  seems  that  the  mantra  echoing  across  Europe 




































































































































































                                                 
11 Available on request from author. They support agents’ difficulties in addressing complex tasks.    14 
 
Human beings deviate in one way or another from the standard assumptions of the 
rationalistic paradigm in economics. If such deviations from rationality were small 
and purely idiosyncratic, they would on average cancel out, and standard economic 
theory  would  not  be  too  wide  off  the  mark  when  predicting  outcomes  for  large 
aggregates  of  agents.  In  economics,  rationality  means  that  decision-makers  use 
available information in a coherent and systematic way. In cognitive psychology, a 
human being is commonly regarded as a system, which codes and interprets available 
information in a conscious and rational way. But other, less conscious, factors are 
also assumed to govern human behavior in a consistent way. Just to mention another 
long-running  macro  “experiment”  it  is  hard  to  explain,  within  the  standard 
neoclassical  framework,  why  millions  of  people  keep  on  gambling  at  manifestly 
unfair lotteries, suffering systematic losses. A leading statistician, Bruno De Finetti, 
nearly one century ago referred to Lotto as “a tax on fools”. While it is analytically 
true, especially as for “expert” gamblers, a psychological approach could assess the 
case. We may think of Lotto as a dream factory just as the Cinema is. Excluding 
pathological behaviors, in both cases people pay to buy a dream, a temporary escape 
from  the  reality  (if  I  win  I  could…).  In  both  cases  there  is  no  need,  and/or  is 
misleading,  to  compute  impersonal  mathematical  expectations
12.  It  is  this  more 
complex view that can fruitfully support an interpretation of the basic facts pointed 
out in the previous section.  
Some general findings in cognitive psychology are validly exploitable to address the 
over-pessimism in judgments and the over-optimism in people’s forecasts (Tversky 
and  Kahneman,  1982,  1974,  1973).  Psychologists  suggest  that,  compared  to 
unfamiliar information, familiar information is more easily accessible from memory 
and  is believed to  be more real  or relevant. Therefore,  mere repetition of certain 
information in the media, regardless of its accuracy, makes it more easily available 
and therefore falsely perceived as more accurate. The explanation is completed by 
noticing that, according to Doms and Morin (2004), the media tend to overweight bad 
                                                 
12 Bovi (2005), working with consumer survey data, test the emotional content of different kind of 
goods.   15 
economic news
13. In fact, that is just the very basic nature of the news media. So, 
there  are  reasons  inducing  individuals  toward  dispositional  pessimism.  Can 
psychology accomplish people’s tendency to forecast over-optimistically, as well? 
Once again, my answer is yes. According to the psychological law of small numbers, 
by contrast to the statistical law of large numbers, people believe that the mean value 
from a small sample also has a distribution concentrated at the expected value of the 
random  variable.  This  leads  to  a  bias  due  to  “overinference”  from  (too)  short 
sequences  of  observations.  In  an  overview  of  behavioral  finance,  Shleifer  (2000) 
argues that the law of small numbers may explain the excess sensitivity of stock 
prices (Shiller, 1981) as a result of investors’ overreacting to short strings of good 
news. Likewise, as suggested by Shiller (2000), another aspect of overconfidence 
(irrational exuberance in the famous Mr. Greenspan’s 1996 speech) is that people 
tend to make forecasts in uncertain situations by looking for familiar patterns and 
assuming  that  future  favorable  patterns  will  resemble  past  ones,  often  without 
sufficient consideration of the reasons for the pattern or the probability of the pattern 
repeating  itself.  When  forecasting  national  lottery  numbers,  individuals  seem  to 
follow the opposite approach. They tend to bet on “hot” numbers (i.e. numbers that 
have  been coming  up  a  lot  lately),  in  that assuming  that  future  patterns  will  not 
resemble past ones. Human beings are really bizarre from an econometric point of 
view. Finally, we may resort to the so called hindsight bias (Shiller, 2000). Suppose 
there is an unexpected event. People tend to concoct explanations for it after the fact, 
which makes them appear more predictable, and less random, than it is. Our minds 
are  designed  to  retain,  for  efficient  storage,  past  information  that  fits  into  a 
compressed narrative. This distortion prevents agents from adequately learning from 
the past. The point I want to stress is that these departures from mathematical/rational 
expectations may help in understanding the presence of the long run bias. 
Let us now turn the attention to the other stylized fact emphasized in the previous 
section. Why people believe that their own situation can be consistently better than 
the general one? To answer, the phenomenon of the illusion of control is validly 
exploitable  (DeBondt  and  Thaler,  1995).  It  belongs  to  the  more  general  class  of 
                                                 
13 Doms and Morin (2004) find that news affect consumers’ sentiment about general situations more 
deeply than that on personal conditions. The approach of this paper may help in explaining their result.    16 
egocentric  biases,  among  overconfidence  and  unrealistic  optimism  (Msetfi  HW DO, 
2006 for a survey). It is magnified by skill-related factors, in the present case the 
greater familiarity with the personal situation, and it is defined as “an expectancy of a 
personal  success  probability  inappropriately  higher  than  the  objective  probability 
would warrant” (Langer 1975, p. 313). Closely related to the illusion to control, there 
is the theory of depressive realism. In a seminal paper, Alloy and Abramson (1979) 
found that non-depressed people are more likely than depressed people to think that 
outcomes are contingent on their actions when they are not. They concluded that as 
opposed to depressed people, whose perceptions are apparently accurate, common 
people distort reality in an optimistic fashion. One interpretation of depressive realism 
is that non-depressed people possess a positive bias, which allows them to feel in 
control of their environment. Since, hopefully, the representative European is non-
depressed, evidence supports agents’ tendency to think that it is systematically less 




Everyday practice presents survey data on consumer sentiment by means of a single 
measure.  Alike,  mainstream  literature  analyzes  summary  information  from  the 
surveys, usually in the form of confidence indexes. While it is easy to understand the 
factual  need  to  report  easily  accessible  indicators,  aggregation/quantification 
procedures  necessarily  imply  loss  of  information  (not  mentioning  the 
issues/assumptions  they  involve).  Needless  to  say,  every  clue  on  consumers’ 
perceptions  may  be  important  for  policy  makers  and  economists  in  order  to 
understand  their  behavior.  Since  long-running-large-scale  disaggregated  data  on 
people’s  sentiment are available,  it is  hard  to  rationalize  why  so few  works  take 
advantage of them. While agents may act differently from what they say, the message 
contained in surveys of people in households can be validly and usefully decoded to 
infer intriguing aspects of consumers’ way of thinking. 
This paper has presented brand new empirical evidence on how, and how accurately, 
people assess economic systems. Another contribution is the analysis of traditional   17 
qualitative survey data via  cognitive  economics. Results from individual response 
options suggest that survey respondents reply, on average, as expected. Agents think 
to know their own situation better than the system wide one, and the past better than 
the future. Also, perceptions accumulate towards the “stationarity” of the economic 
stance.  Confirming  Manski  (2004),  these  commonsense  outcomes  support  the 
hypothesis that survey data give a faithful representation of people’s opinions. This is 
not the only story told by the surveys. Paradoxical outcomes emerge too. Data show 
people’s tendency to judge over-pessimistically and/or to forecast over-optimistically 
and, hence, the emergence of a non-zero “forecast” error. Finally, individuals seem to 
believe that their own situation may consistently drift apart from the general one. 
These puzzling results are in sharp contrast with the standard maintained hypothesis 
of a world populated by calculating and unemotional maximizers. This paper argued 
that this does not necessarily hamper the reliability of the information content of 
surveys of people in households. As a matter of fact, there are well-known cognitive 
phenomena explaining the macroeconometric paradoxes. Just to mention, illusion of 
control suggests that agents’ responses on future economic developments should be 
seen as illusions not as forecasts. Thus, everyday practice could find useful to address 
the CSI weighting scheme even from a psychological point of view. As for economic 
literature,  whereas  statistics  teaches  us  that  we  must  not  infer  causes  from 
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$33(1',; THE DISTRIBUTION OF EUROPEANS’ RESPONSES ON ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
 
Sample 1985:01–2005:07 for all countries but for Austria (starting date 1995:10), Finland (1987:11), 
Luxembourg (2002:01), Portugal (1986:06), Spain (1986:06), and Sweden (1995:10). 
 
Q1=How has the financial situation of your household changed over the last 12 months? It has ...  
Q2 How do you expect the financial position of your household to change over the next 12 months? It 
will ... 
Q3=How do you think the general economic situation in the country has changed over the past 12 
months? It has ...  
Q4 How do you expect the general economic situation in the country to develop over the next 12 
months? It will ...  
 
PP=got/get a lot better; P=got/get a little better; E=stayed/stay the same; M=got/get a little worse; 
MM=got/get a lot worse; N=don' t know.  
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$33(1',;. EUROPEANS’ FORECASTS ERRORS. 
 
Graphs plot the “forecast error” computed as 100*[Q1_i-Q2_i(-12)]/[Q1_i+Q2_i(-12)] and 100*[Q3_i-Q4_i(-12)]/[Q3_i+Q4_i(-
12)] where i=PP, P, E, M, MM. The headers (PP, P, etc.) refer to the six possible responses. Other details in Appendix 1. The 
statistics reported at the end of each page follow the order of graphs. Thus, e.g., the second column refer to Austria_Personal, the 
last to France_General.  The last row (% in± 5% band) report the number of values (as % of total) within the ± 5 band, i.e
=  the 



















































































































19 86 1 988 1 99 0 19 92 19 94 199 6 19 98 2 000 200 2 20 04
FRANCE_GENERAL
 
  Mean  -3.1  -15.1  4.5  -10.1  17.0  22.1  6.1  4.2  -12.3  -25.2  6.2  17.4  6.4  11.9  -9.8  -19.3 
 Std. Dev.  24.1  39.8  32.1  49.0  22.3  37.5  16.8  50.3  49.8  47.8  24.7  28.2  17.0  43.8  16.9  34.7 
 J-B Prob.  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.73  0.42  0.06  0.26  0.05  0.02  0.00  0.24  0.47  0.41  0.00  0.00  0.06 





































































































Mean  23.6  28.3  -1.7  -32.2  2.9  -27.5  16.8  4.0  2.1  9.2  12.8  -1.4  9.0  -7.3 
 Std. Dev.  28.1  40.9  35.5  31.2  16.1  42.6  16.0  49.6  63.6  9.3  21.6  42.6  15.5  33.2 
 J-B Prob.  0.31  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.77  0.10  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.67  0.00  0.40  0.76  0.18 






















































































































Mean  -28.4  -17.9  -10.0  -16.4  3.8  -10.4  -4.6  -4.4  -24.7  -24.6  -17.3  -10.9  -9.7  -16.7  -23.1  -39.9 
 Std. Dev.  9.9  23.0  13.2  30.4  16.1  36.0  8.1  21.4  20.9  24.1  10.5  19.2  12.9  29.6  10.5  26.1 
 J-B Prob.  0.74  0.29  0.88  0.02  0.75  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.42  0.01 







































































































Mean  -5.5  -5.3  -25.5  -35.6  -16.5  -34.0  -3.2  -13.7  -16.9  -18.2  -8.1  -10.7  -10.8  -15.5 
 Std. Dev.  13.4  26.6  18.0  26.3  7.4  13.5  13.1  31.9  38.3  43.4  13.7  25.8  9.2  22.8 
 J-B Prob.  0.21  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.60  0.71  0.08  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.77  0.00  0.00 





















































































































 Mean  1.7  -15.7  -2.1  -8.5  -7.2  -12.0  -2.3  2.8  -5.4  -8.4  3.3  -4.4  -0.9  -4.0  0.6  -5.5 
 Std. Dev.  5.9  8.5  4.9  13.7  4.2  14.5  5.5  7.8  11.6  14.2  3.9  11.2  2.8  17.6  3.1  10.5 
 J-B Prob.  0.2  0.4  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 






































































































Mean  -8.3  -18.6  -4.5  -15.1  4.5  -13.4  -3.5  -4.0  7.2  -1.7  0.4  -1.7  -3.9  -8.6 
 Std. Dev.  5.0  12.9  6.7  14.8  3.0  10.7  5.1  16.6  7.0  16.9  4.9  8.7  6.3  12.8 
 J-B Prob.  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.66  0.30  0.05  0.00  0.61  0.00  0.00  0.59  0.15  0.00 

















































































































198 6 1 988 19 90 199 2 1 994 19 96 199 8 2 000 20 02 200 4
FRANCE_GENERAL
 
Mean  4.6  16.6  21.5  12.7  20.2  7.1  15.9  -5.3  21.8  25.3  22.9  18.7  16.7  0.6  16.4  12.6 
 Std. Dev.  15.8  14.0  14.2  17.8  13.4  18.1  10.6  22.8  14.9  16.0  11.4  12.6  9.9  26.3  10.9  10.6 
 J-B Prob.  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.7  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.6  0.0 

































































































198 6 1 988 19 90 199 2 1 994 19 96 199 8 2 000 20 02 200 4
UK_GENERAL
Mean  21.7  4.6  32.8  20.3  7.6  26.1  4.4  -6.3  12.1  14.1  7.1  6.2  13.8  12.7 
 Std. Dev.  10.8  15.2  14.9  13.5  12.1  13.3  16.9  28.5  12.4  15.1  13.5  26.2  9.4  12.1 
 J-B Prob.  0.1  0.7  0.2  0.4  1.0  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.8  0.8  0.3  0.7  1.0 


















































































































198 6 1 988 19 90 199 2 1 994 19 96 199 8 2 000 20 02 200 4
FRANCE_GENERAL
Mean  34.1  31.8  36.9  25.4  35.6  29.3  39.5  -0.7  13.3  9.6  35.6  27.1  42.3  21.3  33.5  31.2 
 Std. Dev.  17.7  22.2  27.2  28.6  17.1  30.5  19.9  31.1  29.1  28.8  25.9  21.7  16.0  36.0  14.6  18.7 
 J-B Prob.  0.4  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.0  0.9  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.3 

































































































198 6 1 988 19 90 199 2 1 994 19 96 199 8 2 000 20 02 200 4
UK_GENERAL
Mean  36.5  25.6  46.7  38.2  33.0  24.4  29.5  13.7  21.8  18.4  40.5  22.0  32.8  24.4 
 Std. Dev.  19.3  25.7  18.4  22.7  20.8  24.7  16.6  32.4  39.8  43.7  21.3  28.7  15.2  19.0 
 J-B Prob.  0.1  0.0  0.7  0.1  0.4  0.6  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.9  0.0  0.9 
% in ± 5% band  3.8  5.5  0.9  5.1  3.2  6.5  3.0  14.0  8.3  6.0  1.9  6.6  1.3  8.5 
 